With increasing traffic there often are environmental and economical reasons to optimise Simultaneous Converging Instrument Approaches (SCIA) without sacrificing the high safety levels realised in air traffic. One of the well known safety issues of SCIA is the risk of a mid air collision due to a double missed approach. The aim of this paper is to show through a working example that there is a clear advantage to evaluate the safety through support of advanced accident risk assessment methodology. In this paper such methodology is applied to a specific example of SCIA at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol. Comparison of the obtained results against FAA established SCIA criteria shows that there are situations in which these FAA criteria are not met; however, the collision risk is not higher than for similar situations that would satisfy these criteria. The implication for Amsterdam Airport Schiphol is that a specific change can be introduced as being risk neutral. The implication for other busy airports with converging runways might be that there is room to develop new or improved SCIA without compromising safety.
Introduction
Many airports in the world have converging runways. Due to increasing traffic, these airports have environmental and economic incentives to allow for Simultaneous Converging Instrument Approaches (SCIA) without compromising established safety levels. And if safe SCIA were not feasible, then Dependent Converging Instrument Approaches (DCIA) are another option. One of the well known safety issues of SCIA and DCIA is to safely manage a double missed approach (MA). The basic studies on these safety management issues have been performed by MITRE; first for SCIA [Newman et al., 1981; Weiss, 1986] , and later for DCIA [Smith et al., 1992] . The analysis used in these basic studies consists of a systematic "worst" case reasoning about MAs.
This might lead to safety conservative requirements on SCIA and on DCIA. The aim of the current paper is to show through an example that the existing criteria of allowing SCIA indeed may be relaxed by systematically exploiting an accident risk assessment modelling approach.
Existing SCIA criteria
Although ICAO provides criteria for simultaneous instrument operations on parallel or near parallel runways [ICAO, 1988] , these criteria do not address SCIA. The FAA, however, has systematically developed SCIA criteria [FAA, 1993] , which are often referred to as the TERPS+3 criteria, and which come down to:
1. Non-intersecting straight-in final approach courses; 2. MA Points (MAPt's), for latest yes/no landing decision, must be at least 3 nautical miles apart; 3. Published MA paths diverge by at least 45 degrees and the associated primary TERPS surfaces do not overlap; 4. ATC shall designate separation responsibility and procedures to be applied in the event of a MA initiated beyond the MAPt; 5. ATC may establish higher weather minima than published to preclude, to the extent feasible, the possibility of a weather related MA.
By McCartor et al. [1997] , it has also been shown that properly equipped FMS aircraft that execute a MA on the autopilot could do much better than criterion 3 requires. In line with this, for a limited category of aircraft, criterion 3 has been tightened and criterion 2 has been replaced by the requirement that the MAPt on the secondary runway should not be lower than 650 feet [FAA, 1998 ].
For airports that frequently experience low ceiling conditions, the FAA criteria imply a serious limitation in the effective exploitation of SCIA, and a similarly frequent limitation of airport -6-NLR- TP-2003-557 capacity. Hence from an airport capacity point of view it would be very valuable to have an approach that allows relaxation of the existing SCIA criteria, 2 and 3 in particular.
Example considered
The specific example considered in this paper is SCIA on runways 19R and 22 of Amsterdam Airport Schiphol, the geometry of which is depicted in Figure 1 . As explained below, for this example TERPS+3 criteria 1, 2, 4 and 5 are satisfied, and 3 is not.
Runway 19R is one of Schiphol's four main runways. It has its MAPt at 0.46 nautical miles before the threshold (ILS height is 200 ft) and has a straight MA path, while runway 22 is a secondary non-intersecting runway with its MAPt at 1 nautical mile before the threshold (ILS height is 350 feet) and a MA path that is 63 degrees turning left [AIP, 2000] . The distance between the two MAPt's is 3.03 nmi; hence the first and second TERPS+3 criteria of [FAA, 1993] are satisfied. Since the MA paths diverge by 25° only, which is less than the required 45°, the third TERPS+3 criterion is not satisfied. The 19R runway controller is prepared to instruct a right turning MA to an aircraft on 19R if an aircraft on 22 makes a straight MA, which means that the 4 th TERPS+3 criterion is satisfied. Finally, allowance of SCIA on runways 19R and 22
is limited to conditions of relatively high headwind for runway 22, i.e. this falls within the 5 th TERPS+3 criterion. Figure 1 Geometry of runways 19R and 22 at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol and the AIP specified missed approach paths.
-7-NLR- TP-2003-557 When runway 22 is in use the lowest forecasted broken-clouds-ceiling for selecting runway 22 as landing runway is 400ft. Frequent low broken-clouds-ceiling conditions at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol invite a lowering of this selection criterion to 300 ft, and to do so the MAPt for runway 22 should be shifted some 0.5 nmi towards the threshold. Then the distance between the MAPt's of runway 22 and 19R would become 2.86 nmi, which would mean that TERPS+3 criterion number 2 is no longer satisfied for SCIA on runways 22 and 19R. In order to determine whether there exists a sound rationale for applying risk criteria numbers 2 and 3 to this example, a risk assessment modelling study has been conducted following the approach of [Blom et al., 2001a] . This modelling study is organised in two phases:
• Phase 1: to develop an initial risk assessment model that is able to make a relative comparison of accident risks due to double MAs with the old and the new MAPt's.
• Phase 2: to refine the risk assessment model such that it enables a comparison of the risk due to double MAs with established accident risk criteria for en-route traffic.
Phase 1 study
During phase 1, relative accident risk assessments have been performed for two situations: one with the MAPt for runway 22 at 1 nmi before the threshold, and the other with the MAPt shifted 0.5 nmi towards the threshold. As a result of this shift, the distance between the MAPt's reduces from 3.03 nmi to 2.86 nmi, the latter of which is below the 3 nmi of the 2 nd TERPS+3 criterion.
The steps performed are:
• Identification of existing and new operations, including the relevant scenarios and the associated hazards, both through brainstorms and interviews with experts, and through making use of dedicated hazard and incident data bases.
• Development of the mathematical model, including model assumptions and assessment of parameter values, and integration with the identified scenarios.
The key finding of phase 1 was that the developed model of the SCIA operation on 19R and 22 is risk neutral with respect to the proposed shifting of the MAPt for runway 22 towards its threshold [Blom et al., 2001b] . The rationale for this finding is that in the model the largest contribution to accident risk stems from a non-negligible probability that both aircraft follow a straight MA path. This finding also implied that it would not improve safety to increase the MA path turning angle for runway 22 such that the 3 rd TERPS+3 criterion would be satisfied.
Phase 2 study
The aim of the phase 2 study is to refine the risk assessment model and subsequently compare the double MA's risk of conducting SCIA on runways 19R×22 against established collision risk criteria. The steps performed are:
• In order to allow for a significant reduction of the level of uncertainty in the assessed risk, site-specific statistical data on MAs and their reasons has been collected in collaboration with ATC the Netherlands.
• On the basis of this information, the accident risk assessment model and its assumptions were further improved, and subsequently the modelled accident risk was evaluated.
• Subsequently, a bias and uncertainty analysis was performed, following a recently developed approach [Everdij and Blom, 2002] .
• Finally, the obtained accident risk results were compared against arisk criterion that is derived from ICAO's TLS for collision between en-route flying aircraft [ICAO, 1998 ].
Aim and organisation of this paper
This paper aims to present the phase 2 results and is organised as follows. First, an overview is provided of the main probabilistic models collected during both phases for the Schiphol example considered. Then an explanation shows how these probabilistic models are integrated into a mathematical collision risk model. This is followed by a section that introduces the specific Schiphol example scenarios that have been evaluated during phase 2, and gives the accident risk results obtained for these scenarios. Finally a summary of findings and conclusions is given both for the specific Schiphol example and for the TERPS+3 criteria for SCIA in general.
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Modelling of missed approaches
One of the important steps required for the accident risk assessment is to develop probabilistic models of MAs. The aim of this section is to explain the main issues covered by this modelling:
• Landing traffic flows
In addition to this, other probabilistic models have been adopted for issues such as aircraft speed behaviour, wind conditions, and the size of the aircraft involved. Details are given in [Blom et al., 2001d] .
Landing traffic flows
Based on the evaluation of statistical data for the percentages of landing heavy/medium/light aircraft on runways 19R and 22, the following percentages of arrival weight category, as shown in Table 1 , have been chosen for 19R and 22. This is referred to as Model assumption M.1.
The arrival spread over the weight classes is based on arrival trajectories reconstructed from radar data over several one-month periods. This has shown that the uncertainty of assumption M.1 is small.
Arrivals on 19R Arrivals on 22
Heavy 22% 0%
Medium 78% 85% Light 0% 15% Table 1 Arrival category percentages.
The traffic flow is assumed to be 30 arrivals per hour for each runway. This is referred to as Model assumption M.37. Furthermore it is assumed that none of this traffic is equipped with TCAS, and that no use is made of see-and-avoid. This is covered by Model assumptions M.15
and M.16 respectively.
Missed approach frequencies
During the first phase of the study there appeared to be significant uncertainty regarding the frequencies of MAs [Blom et al., 2001b] . During the second phase of the study this problem has been addressed through making use of the fact that since June 1995 tower controllers at Schiphol have systematically been reporting MAs as part of the safety management process of -10-NLR- TP-2003-557 ATC the Netherlands. This data set covering June 1995 through mid December 2000 has been analysed in a statistical sense. The first analysis was directed towards the variety in reasons and the percentages, the result of which is depicted in Table 2 for both uncommon and potentially common causes.
Further analysis of the MA reports has shown that there were 21 reported double (or triple)
MAs within 4 minutes, from which 15 are subsequent MAs of aircraft that were approaching the same runway under proper separation conditions. This leaves 6 double or triple MAs on converging runways (all within 2 minutes):
• One coincidentally double MA (shorthand notation: Coinc) 1 , • One double MA caused by Tower R/T down (shorthand notation: Tower),
• One triple MA and one double MA caused by severe Wind (shorthand notation: Wind),
• One triple MA caused by Meteo info down (shorthand notation: Meteo),
• One double MA caused by severe wind during Mixed mode operation, i.e. a departure in between arrivals. In this case, severe wind initiated a MA for an arrival at one runway. In response to this a departure aircraft on the other runway had to wait, and the subsequent arrival aircraft on the same runway had to initiate a MA too (shorthand notation: Mixed).
It was also verified if any of these double or triple MAs had led to a critical incident; it turned out that none of them had done so.
Besides the above mentioned causes for a double MA, also airport great Alert (i.e. closing the airport e.g. because of a major fire) has been identified as a cause for a double MA (shorthand notation: Alert).
On the basis of these statistical MA data, expert based estimates of relevant exposure frequencies and MA reporting reliability, double MA frequencies have been estimated, they are given in Table 3 and referred to as Model Assumption M.30a. Due to the use of a Bayesian estimation approach a zero count leads to a non zero expectation and the uncertainty in the estimated frequency values is also known. For all except mixed mode, the 95% uncertainty interval for the frequency values goes a factor 1.5 up and a factor 1.5 down.
For mixed mode, this uncertainty interval is a factor (1.5) 2 .
Missed approach initiation heights
Since the MA initiation heights in the Schiphol data set either were often not reported or not well reported, use has been made of world-wide KLM pilot MA reports over the time period
September 1992 to May 1994 [Blom et al., 2001d] . This data provides an indication for the reasons of initiating MAs, and their altitude and frequency of occurrence. Based on this data, a histogram has been constructed of MA initiation heights. Subsequently, this histogram has been fitted with a weighted sum of a Rayleigh density and a uniform density as depicted in Figure 2 .
The probability density function of MA initiation height is a density fit of this histogram, which is a weighted sum of Rayleigh density (60%) with mean 300ft and a Uniform density (40%).
This is referred to as Model assumption M.4.
It is also assumed that for each of the double MA causes in Table 3 only one of the following two densities applies:
• The Rayleigh density for double MAs initiated due to Tower R/T blocked and due to severe
Wind.
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• The uniform density for all other double MAs.
Since the histogram is based on the world-wide trip reports of one airline, there may be a significant uncertainty level in the shape of the histogram, and thus in the fitted densities (60% Rayleigh and 40% Uniform). MA initiation height (ft) MA trip report frequency Figure 2 Histogram of KLM pilot MA trip reports and of density fit, which is a weighted sum of a Rayleigh density (60%) with mean 300ft and a Uniform density on 0-1200ft (40%).
Missed approach climb behaviour
Based on [ICAO-CRM, 1980] , probabilistic models for the lateral deviations from nominal MA paths are available; this is referred to as Model assumption M.6a. For vertical behaviour during MA, ICAO-CRM provides a parabolic vertical path model for the change from descent to climb, and then a model for minimum climb rate requirement only (2.5%). The parabolic vertical path model has been adopted as Model assumption M.6c, and the minimal climb rate requirement is used for 1% of the MA climbs to cover non-nominal climbs.
McCartor et al. [1997] provides histograms of simulated FMS-LNAV climb performance during MAs. As a reasonable approximation of these densities, we assumed a Gaussian density with mean value 10 m/s and standard deviation of 2 m/s for the other 99% MAs. This particular combination of models is referred to as Model assumption M.5.
The rate of climb is assumed to continue until the final MA altitude (of 2000ft) has been reached; this is referred to as Model assumption M.18. In reality aircraft level off gradually on autopilot, or may overshoot when levelling off without autopilot.
Once the final MA altitude has been reached it is assumed that for all aircraft weight categories (heavy, medium and light), the vertical deviations at final MA altitude are assumed to be Gaussian with standard deviation of 10 m. This is referred to as Model assumption M.6b. The true standard deviation may be up to a factor 2 larger or smaller, and thus there is a significant uncertainty 2 .
Turn during missed approach
Although in most cases a turn is made when it is prescribed by the AIP, there is a non-zero probability α AIP that a pilot forgets to make a turn during the MA as prescribed in the AIP.
Assuming that the pilots are well aware of the AIP published MA path, (Model assumption M.11), the expert-based estimated values for α AIP vary from 0.05 to 0.22, with 0.10 as best estimate. The last value is referred to as Model assumption M.29.
Based on information collected from experienced (airline) pilots on various aircraft, it was
identified that the logical moment at which the pilot starts a turn during a MA is where the pilot completes a well trained sequence of aircraft reconfiguration activities and the aircraft has reached sufficient height. This expert knowledge has resulted in the development of probabilistic models for the reconfiguration of an aircraft during MA, which are referred to as
Model assumption M.20, and the details of which are given for Boeing 737 and Airbus A320 in 
Controller turn instructions
If aircraft on runways 22 and 19R both make a MA then the way of working is that the 19R Table 5 Expert estimated values for the probability that the 19R controller is not successful in letting the aircraft on 19R make a right turn in case of a double MA. -17-NLR- TP-2003-557 3 Mathematical modelling
Integration of mathematical models
For the integration of the mathematical models, the Dynamically Coloured Petri Net (DCPN) approach is used [Everdij et al., 1997; Everdij and Blom, 2000] . During DCPN development, use is made of a functional representation of ATM. The functional subsystems and their interrelations are depicted in Figure 3 .
For this particular risk assessment application it appeared to be sufficient to develop a Petri net for the aircraft behaviour only. One such Petri net is necessary for each aircraft separately. This there is a token in each place from which there is an arc). All other transitions are guard transitions, which means that from the moment that the transition is enabled an additional condition has to become true prior to the actual firing of the transition. Table 6 specifies these guard transition delays.
-19-NLR- TP-2003-557 On the basis of such a DCPN specification it is rather straightforward to make a software implementation to run Monte Carlo simulations. In theory, collision risk assessment is then a matter of running Monte Carlo simulations and then counting the events at which aircraft shapes physically start to overlap. In practice, this approach finds its limitation in the number of Monte Carlo simulations that can be reasonably run within a few hours 3 . In order to improve on this, stochastic analysis is used to decompose the collision risk in parts, each of which can be assessed separately. In order to take maximal advantage of the particular encounter situation under study and the statistical data available, the development of such a risk decomposition is situation specific. Below, we outline how this is done for the double MA scenario, following [Blom et al., 2001c] .
Transition Guard function evaluates to True if:
To Table 6 Guard transitions in Figure 4 . [Hsu, 1981] .
Risk of collision between aircraft
Following reference [Bakker and Blom, 1993] , the risk of collision R between two aircraft is expressed to be equal to a tight upper bound for the expected number of incrossings, between one aircraft i and another aircraft j in an appropriate time-interval [0,T] as follows
where ϕ ij (t) is the incrossing rate between aircraft i and j, which is defined as
From here on, in this paper time T is always chosen large enough such that the probability that the aircraft pair (i,j) collides outside interval [0, T] is negligibly small.
Collision risk per approach
Now define R as the probability that aircraft i and j make MAs on 19R and 22 respectively, and both aircraft collide with each other. Also define stopping times τ i and τ ij for aircraft i and the 
where the summation is over all runway 22 aircraft j.
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Aircraft types and double missed approach causes
The event sequence classification process { } (4) where set K is defined as 
Decomposition over manoeuvre combinations
Through adopting some technical assumptions and a lengthy derivation it is possible to extend the risk decomposition of equation (4) 
Decomposition of incrossing rate
Following [Bakker and Blom, 1993] , the conditional incrossing rate satisfies ( 
Numerical evaluation of equations
To assess risk numerically, first equation (9) is evaluated. For each relevant (κ, w) the following steps have to be performed:
• Monte Carlo simulation of double MAs on runways 19R×22.
• This yields histograms of simulated statistical information for the relative aircraft positions and speeds, to which sums of Gaussian densities are fitted.
• Equation (9) (7) and this into (6) and (5), to yield a numerical value for R . This numerical evaluation scheme has to be performed for each of the operational scenarios that are presented next.
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Risk assessment of operational scenarios
In this section, the risk assessment model is used to evaluate several SCIA operational scenarios for runway 19R×22. First, a series of operational scenarios is defined. Subsequently the risk assessment is performed in a sequence of steps. Finally, a comparison is made against established risk criteria.
Operational scenarios
The operational scenario variables identified for evaluation are:
• AIP published MA path for runway 19R: Straight MA path versus Right Turn MA path.
• Mixed mode operations, i.e. a departure in between two arrivals: Allowed versus Not allowed.
• Instructions by runway controller: None versus Turn on 19R versus Extra climb on 19R.
In total this yields 12 combinations, of which the ones in Table 7 For each of these Operational scenarios in Table 7 , the set of equations (5-9) has to be evaluated in a numerical sense. This is organised in two steps:
• Assess conditional collision risks ) (w G κ µ using equations (7,9) • Assess collision risk G R κ and Σ R using equations (5,6) During subsequent third and fourth steps, bias and uncertainty in the risk values is assessed following [Everdij and Blom, 2002] , and the bias and uncertainty corrected risk levels are compared against established risk criteria. The results of these four steps are given in the following four subsections.
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Model based conditional collision risk
To evaluate equations (5) and (6) for the seven operational scenarios in Table 7 
for the w -values that are relevant to assess the operational scenarios in Table 7 .
To assess the conditional collision risks
for each of the w -values in Table 8 according to equation (7), there appeared to be 120 ( ) As expected, all risk values of the Rayleigh PDF MA initiation height are higher than those for the Uniform PDF MA initiation height; the only exception is formed by the risk values for both aircraft making a straight MA. Also as expected is that the conditional collision risk values are worst when both aircraft make a straight MA. However, these risk values are almost five orders of magnitude worse than the risk values in case at least one of the aircraft makes a turn. The implication is that as long as there is a small chance that both aircraft make straight MAs then the conditional risk values at the top of Table 8 determine the total risk, and this is neutral regarding the precise shape of the MA initiation height PDF. This corresponds with the key finding of the phase 1 study [Blom et al., 2001b] . Another observation that can be made is that, for the runway combination considered, a turn appears to be more effective than an extra climb of 500 ft.
Model based collision risk
The next step in the assessment of collision risk is to evaluate equations (5) and (6) per scenario, using the conditional collision risk values from Table 8 and The resulting collision risk values are presented in Table 9 . This shows that the model-based total risks vary up to a factor of 100 with the scenario, with the Mixed Mode allowed scenario 0 having highest risk and scenarios 3, 4 and 6 having lowest risk. Before drawing further conclusions it is better to assess bias and uncertainty in these risk values first. Table 9 Model based collision risks for SCIA on 19R×22.
S c e n a r i o
Since the risk from double straight MAs provides the largest contributions, the values in Table 9 satisfy the following approximations: Table 5 1
-3 (first row in Table 8) -27-NLR-TP-2003-557
Bias and uncertainty assessment
The risk values in Table 9 apply to the mathematical model of the operational scenarios. Since such a mathematical model differs from reality, one should expect that the model-based risk differs from the true risk. The question then is to assess this difference in terms of bias and uncertainty relative to the model based risk. Recently, Everdij and Blom [2002] have developed a methodology to conservatively assess the bias and the 95% uncertainty band due to these differences. To apply this methodology to the SCIA scenarios of Table 9 , we first give the equations of the total expected risk (10) with bias factor B and 95% uncertainty band (up and down) factor C exp satisfying:
where n XY ≡ total number of XY valued model assumptions, with X ∈ {Considerable (C), Significant (S), Minor (M), Small (Sm), Negligible (N)}, and with Y ∈ {Pessimistic (P), Uncertain (U), Optimistic (O)}, and with factors
Here, pessimistic expected direction means that the modelled risk increases due to the assumption (i.e. the expected risk will be smaller than the model based risk). Optimistic expected direction means that the modelled risk reduces due to the assumption (i.e. the expected risk will be larger). Uncertainty expected direction means that it is expected that the influence on the modelled risk results is uncertain.
In this approach, positive and negative bias factors may (partly) compensate each other, while uncertainty band factors accumulate in a non-linear way. This approach requires safety conservative assessment of model assumptions against reality. Due to such safety conservatism -28-NLR- TP-2003-557 the chance that the risk falls above and below the assessed uncertainty band is 2.5% or less and 2.5% or more, respectively.
To assess the impact of all assumptions on collision risk and to determine uncertainty bands, all modelling assumptions except M.15 (i.e. no TCAS) are assessed in a particular sequence to take into account dependencies [Everdij and Blom, 2002] . In case of lack of knowledge, a safety conservative approach has been taken. For parameter value assumptions the contribution to the uncertainty is assessed with support of model based parameter sensitivity analysis. The results of this assessment are presented in Table 10 . Table 10 Overview of main results of expected effects of assumptions on the collision risk for the various scenarios. The model assumptions are introduced in the section on modelling.
Model assumption M.15 (No TCAS) is not evaluated.
By counting the n XY 's in Table 10 and substituting this in equations (10-12) we get the results in Figure 5 and in the last row of Table 11. To complete Table 11 , we use 
Comparison against risk criteria
For the SCIA operation considered, a generally accepted safety requirement does not exist.
Nevertheless, relevant comparisons can be made: 1) a comparison with the maximal JAR allowable 10 -9 of catastrophic risk per flying hour and per airborne system failure [JAR 25.1309] , and 2) a comparison regarding an adequate use of SCIA to reduce the flight arrival delay, and thus also the collision risk exposure due to reduced flying time (e.g. in the stack).
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JAR based criterion
If we assume that the average duration of a flight is two hours, then the maximal JAR allowable catastrophic risk per flight and per airborne system failure is 2Â -9
. If we were to adopt this same criterion for allowing catastrophic risk per external cause then most of the individual terms in Table 11 appear to satisfy this criterion. The exceptions are the Mixed mode terms in scenarios 0, 1 and 5, and the Wind terms in scenarios 0 and 2. It should be noticed that any possible effect of TCAS is not taken into account in the estimated risk values of Table 11 .
ICAO based criterion
To gain further insight we express the expected extra risk in terms of the number of minutes extra flying time that would lead to a similar risk of collision with another aircraft. The rationale behind this is that the reason for conducting SCIA operations is to increase capacity in order to reduce delay (= extra flying time) in the order of minutes per arrival. This reduction in flying time itself implies a reduction in risk of collision with another aircraft (e.g. in the stack). To gain insight into this effect we assume that the exposure of collision with another aircraft corresponds with the TLS adopted by ICAO for fatal accidents per en-route flight hour without taking into account TCAS. Per direction (vertical, lateral, longitudinal) 
Mitigating measures
Although a series of operational scenarios have been assessed, there are several mitigating measure options which have not been considered in this study, e.g.
• Mitigating measures taken such that the occurrence of key hazards is significantly reduced.
(Tower down, severe Wind, and Meteo down, in particular.)
• Training of situation-dependent handling by tower air traffic controllers.
• Increase training of pilots for non-straight MAs.
This means that the assessed risk values for conducting SCIA on 19R×22 can be further decreased if so desired.
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Conclusions
The aim of the paper was to show that an accident risk modelling based evaluation of SCIA on safety has certain advantages over the geometric methods used so far. As an illustrative example, in this paper a risk assessment has been performed regarding simultaneous instrument approaches on converging runway combination 19R×22 at Schiphol. In line with the accident risk assessment methodology of [Blom et al., 2001a] 
Conclusions regarding SCIA on 19R×22
Regarding SCIA on 19R×22 of Schiphol the main findings of the study are:
• The main contribution to the risk is coming from the non-negligible chance that, in case of a double MA, both aircraft fly straight MA paths.
• The highest risk levels occur when simultaneous converging runway operations would be conducted during mixed mode operations (a departure in between arrivals). Mixed mode operations induce significantly higher double MA rates during simultaneous operations on converging runways and therefore the extra risk is significantly higher (factor between 3 to 10) than under non mixed mode operations.
• If Mixed mode operations are not allowed, then the largest contributions to risk come from (other) common causes such as Tower R/T blocked, severe Wind, Meteo info down and airport great Alert. Per approach, the expected extra risk values (probability of collision) lie between 5.7Â -9 and 7.4Â -10 (any possible effect of TCAS is not taken into account). Both these highest and lowest values apply to operational scenarios that do not involve controller intervention.
-33-NLR- TP-2003-557 The identified uncertainty band around the expected risk values extends from about a factor 6 up in risk to a factor 10 or more down in risk. These areas aim to cover 95% of all possibilities for the risk in a conservative way. As such, 2.5% or less may be above the upper bound of the uncertainty band, and 2.5% or more may be below the lower bound of the uncertainty band. The main model assumptions that cause this band are: Theoretically the risk levels for these scenarios are similarly small as the reduction in risk exposure to other aircraft, e.g. due to leaving aircraft 5 minutes shorter in stack when conducting SCIA operations on 19R×22. In view of such marginal net differences in theoretical risk level, one might conclude that SCIA operation on 19R×22 under one of the above mentioned three conditions does not compromise safety.
General conclusions regarding SCIA
The SCIA risk modelling study has revealed a number of issues which have not been addressed in previous studies:
• Common cause double MAs appear far more frequently than coincidental double MAs.
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• Some of these common causes reduce the performance of ATC in a negative way, and some the other way around.
• It has been shown that it is possible to conduct SCIA operations at risk levels that are in healthy balance with risk criteria established by JAR and ICAO.
• The TERPS+3 criteria on the placing of the MAPt's and the non-overlapping primary surfaces appear to have remarkably little impact on the safety of the SCIA operation. With the novel insight it seems worthwhile to study the development of appropriate mitigating measures which potentially contribute to the further development of SCIA operations.
For the specific Schiphol example a reasoning has been proposed to show that SCIA does not compromise safety; neither in relative nor in absolute terms under conditions that fall outside the current TERPS+3 criteria for SCIA operations. For airports with frequent low ceilings it would be valuable to relax these criteria through the adoption of the accident risk assessment methodology discussed in this paper. For an optimal reduction of SCIA criteria a dedicated collection of site specific statistical data on MAs and their reasons would be of great value.
Since the FAA prescribes a systematic reporting by ATC of simultaneous MA events while conducting SCIA [FAA, 1993] one may expect that such valuable information is available. By using this in combination with a systematic accident risk assessment modelling approach, one might reasonably expect that the TERPS+3 criteria can be relaxed significantly on a site specific basis; this would allow bringing into account site specifics on MA practices, probabilities of missing MAs, and double MA frequencies. 
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